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Abstract
This article analyzes the literature, developments and challenges in public-
private partnerships (PPPs) in the case of the water sector in Mumbai, India. 
Owing to an apprehensive approach towards private sector participation in the 
water sector, it is important to look at the history of private sector participation 
in water and other utilities. It has been much debated as to whether water should 
be privatized since it is a public good and a utility essential for life. The ability of 
the public sector to provide effi cient services has also been questioned, resulting 
in the proposal of public-private sector privatization. Such partnerships are 
deemed to be a perfect, balanced method for tackling the shortcomings of the 
public sector and the profi t-oriented private sector, which can provide fi nancial 
back-up. But as we take a closer look at the literature, it is apparent that the 
private sector is no exception to complicated market mechanisms. The private 
sector can face the same fate in the absence of good regulatory operations. 
The solution for each region is location-specifi c and unique to its situation and 
background.
Keywords: India, public-private partnerships, privatization, water security, water 
supply.
Introduction
Recently many efforts towards solving various water related problems have been 
witnessed across the world. The brunt of water crises is borne by developing countries, 
which, incidentally, house the majority of the planet’s population. Thus, there has been 
much attention focused on devising reforms, policy changes and experiments in the water 
sector. Often at the centre of this crisis is private sector participation.
The most serious problem facing developing countries today is a simultaneous 
high rate of urbanization and rapid population growth, which places extreme pressure 
on the infrastructure of urban and surrounding areas. Traditionally, the public sector has 
been responsible for the management of water services, but in recent times, it has been 
argued that they lack the capability that is needed to provide effi cient services in a time of 
increasing demand. This article focuses on the case of water services in Mumbai, India, 




India has a huge abundance of water resources: it is not only surrounded by water bodies, 
but is also bestowed with vast amounts of groundwater, many rivers and several lakes, 
while the great Himalayas in the North are a huge storehouse of water in its solid, frozen 
form. But out of all these sources of water, only a quarter of this water is potable (Gupta 
and Deshpande 2004) and India is plagued by environmental issues, such as “water 
pollution from raw sewage, and run-off from agricultural pesticides” (Sharma, 2005 cited 
in Mercado, n.d.) According to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) World Factbook 
(online source), tap water is also not potable, creating another major problem throughout 
the country, with many Indians queuing up everyday at public taps for water instead. 
Currently, the situation is such that, while urban areas are being provided with 
enough water to fulfi ll their maximum requirements, it is often at a cost to rural regions 
(Shiva 2002). In addition, while most of the problems facing India’s water supply can 
be avoided through the implementation of well-known solutions such as better water 
infrastructure, like many developing countries, it faces major fi nancial hurdles that 
render the problems unavoidable. As such, the entry of the private sector can bring in the 
capital needed, but unfortunately, it can also add its own set of problems, particularly in 
regards to water resource management. This can include price hiking due to the incoming 
investment, and commoditization of water (Budds and McGranahan 2003: 6).
The city of Mumbai has six lakes serving as freshwater resources. Water is treated 
at two facilities, located at Bhandup and Panjrapur, after which it is stored in the 17 
reservoirs situated in the city. Once it reaches the pipelines, however, the resource is 
only made available four hours out of each day, creating a huge gap between supply 
and demand. 1 Intermittent water supply is not the only issue facing the city either: poor 
water quality and contamination, equitable supply issues, and poor customer service from 
the city municipal corporation regarding community issues create further complications 
(Brihanmumbai Municipal Corporation et al. 2007). 
Public-Private Partnerships and Water Security: Defi nition and Context
The United Nations Economic and Social Council’s Committee on Human Development 
and Civil Society (2005) defi nes PPPs as “the combination of a public need with private 
capability and resources to create a market opportunity through which the public need 
is met and a profi t is made.” Crosslin and Robert (1991) defi ne PPPs as “contractual 
arrangements in which private companies assume a greater responsibility and/or risk, 
especially through concession contracts” (cited in Budds and McGranahan 2003: 89). 
ADB’s Public Private Partnership Handbook clearly distinguishes between PPPs, Private 
Sector Participation (PSP) and Privatization based on their nature and mechanisms; 
although it also mentions that they have been interchangeably used (ADB 2008). 
The water sector has two main types of PPPs: the fi rst is the English type of 
complete privatization, in which management and ownership are private; the second is 
the French type, in which management is delegated (eg lease and concession contracts) 
and combines public and private management, while ownership is public (Ouyahia 2006). 
The World Bank favors the French example, which has been widely promoted and adopted 
1   The fi gure excludes the amount of water supplied to the Airport Authority Chatrapati Shivaji Terminus, 
which receives 24 hours of water supply: (Brihanmumbai Municipal Corporation 2007).
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in both developed and developing countries in diverse forms (Ouyahia 2006). 
It begins with a service contract, in which some parts of the operation and 
maintenance of the water utilities are handed over to the private sector. Next is the 
management contract, where the technical and administrative sections are covered by 
the private sector, with some responsibilities over operation and maintenance included. 
The next type is Leasehold, or Affermage, which is similar to a management contract 
but with added responsibilities, such as commercial responsibilities shared by both the 
parties. This is followed by a concessions contract, which is considered the best among 
all the contract types, as they are mid-way between complete privatization and complete 
public ownership. Concessions contracts have assets owned by the public sector while 
investment, risks and operation and maintenance are handed over to the private sector. 
Additionally, the responsibility of the water utilities is owned by the private sector for the 
duration of the contract, and can also contain within them various other types of contracts, 
such as Build-Own-Operate, and Build-Operate-Transfer, etc. Last is the Divesture 
contract, which is equivalent to complete privatization (Hubert 2008). 
The capital is usually provided by the private entity involved, however, it is also 
the case that taxpayers are sometimes called upon to fund the new capital instead (Loxley 
1999: 8). This can become a drawback for those promoting PPPs. If the taxpayers, who 
are in fact the consumers, are the ones who fund the capital, then questions can be raised 
as to why the private sector should then be benefi ting from the whole process. After all, 
its capability to input capital is more often than not the reason for inviting it into such a 
project in the fi rst place. 
To date, water security has not been accurately defi ned in literature, though there 
have been certain attempts. The Framework for Action and the Ministerial Declaration 
of The Hague in March 2000 fi rst raised the concept of water security. The declaration 
discussed what challenges lay ahead in achieving water security. One point mentioned 
is the collaboration among all levels, including consumers, providers and international 
organizations. Hasan et al. (2004) conceptualize water security as the threat to a water 
supply and distribution system by terrorist attacks and other externalities. Hoffmann 
(2006: 7) defi nes it “as the ability to access suffi cient quantities of clean water to maintain 
minimal standards of food and goods production, sanitation and health.” 
Trends and Changes in Public-Private Partnership and Water as a Public Good: A 
Literature Review
At the end of twentieth century, an upswing in industrialization in the West created 
additional stress on management of water and sanitation services. In an attempt to constrain 
the situation and ascertain the reasons why investments in infrastructure were not showing 
expected levels of development, international organizations, such as the United Nations 
(UN) and the World Bank (WB), began to evaluate the reasons for the gap between the 
provision of services at the supplier end and their receivership on the consumer end. 
In the resulting World Development Report (1994), the World Bank recognized the 
failure of the public sector in its role of resource management, characterizing it as inept, 
lacking competition in world markets and corrupt, and so devised the method of PPP 
implementation. Although PPPs were not new to other industries, such as energy and 
health, it was from here that the trend of PPPs in infrastructure projects and the provision 
of public goods began. 
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The UN’s reasons for encouraging private sector activity in the provision of 
water services included making the sector more responsive to consumers and sustaining 
effi ciency and technological expertise (Jones 2005).  
International organizations such as the World Bank and the Asian Development 
Bank promote privatization, claiming that it can result in effective and effi cient use of 
water as a declining resource (ADB 2001; World Bank 1994). Loxley (1999: 2) advocates 
that in the time since PPPs have been implemented, they have been shown to “deliver 
infrastructure and services more effi ciently and at a lower cost than traditional methods.” 
However, the veracity of this is debatable, and has been one of the major challenges 
to those advocating PPPs. Budds and McGranahan (2003) defi ne PPPs as arrangements 
made between the private companies and public providers. The term “partnership” implies 
a mutual agreement of “shared objectives and working arrangements that go beyond the 
fulfi llment of any contractual agreement” (Budds and McGranahan 2003: 89). 
While in some cases the private sector has indeed provided more effi cient services, 
the cost claims have not always added up. An empirical study by Ouyahia (2006: 3), 
which compared the effi ciency of the private and public sector, suggests the results are 
mixed. In developing countries, or transition economies, the most important need is the 
investment input to rehabilitate the existing infrastructure. Since they lack the capital 
to renovate these infrastructures, they are inclined to lean towards PPPs. As noted by 
Ouyahia (2006: 17):
Once the PPPs are implemented, they need to be regulated, provide incentives 
to the private sector, and to protect the consumers from monopoly abuse … 
Private companies need to be assured of the return on investments, because 
investments in the water sector are high and irreversible. 
According to Estache and Goicoechea (2005; in Araral, 2008: 4), the majority of investors 
like to invest in middle-income countries (50 per cent), rather than low-income countries 
(18 per cent). 
In the water sector competition, more than type of ownership can provide better 
results in terms of effi ciency (Ouyahia 2006: 2). Not only does a lack of information, 
transparency, and accountability deter fair competition, so too does political constraint, 
a lack of support from non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and other organizations, 
and unnecessary and lengthy auctioning and bidding processes. The nature of investments 
in the water sector is irreversible (Ouyahia 2006: 17). This can deter investors and thus 
reduce competition. Also because of the presence of a few dominant private water 
companies, there is little space for local private providers. The fact can be ignored that 
these local private providers do not have the fi nancial capabilities to invest (Budds and 
McGrahan 2003: 104–105). 
Another drawback is the different interests of the stakeholders in this process. 
The government, or the public sector, is committed to the socio-economic goals related to 
the provision of these services and infrastructure. The private sector is committed to the 
recovery of costs and turning a profi t on its investment. The NGOs are concerned with 
proper provision to the community, and raise issues related to that provision, such as its 
environmental impact. Thus the different interests of the stakeholders create friction and 
confl icts (Ouyahia 2006: 17). 
Externalities lie in the whole process of water supply, from extraction to storage 
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and treatment, to distribution to the end-user. Since water extraction, storage, treatment 
and distribution are all either stationary processes or located underground, it makes 
the water supply process all the more diffi cult to handle. Costs are thus increasing the 
investment risk. This is one of the reasons why there is less private sector involvement 
in water infrastructure. The end of the 1990s, especially 1998-99, observed a reduction 
in the number of private sector participation projects in the East Asia and Pacifi c (World 
Bank 2009). The rationale being forwarded was that they were either highly risky or not 
considered profi table enough. It was speculated that the private sector was not operating 
in rural areas due their location, and as these areas are also heavily subsidized, the returns 
on the investment would be too low (Ouyahia 2006). If the private sector decided to 
become involved in the rehabilitation of infrastructure, the water tariffs must be aligned 
with the underlying cost (Kessides, 2004 cited in Tan J., 2008). Hence as Kessides (2004) 
mentions (cited in Tan J., 2008) private utility operators over the world are struggling 
with the fi nances needed for maintaining and expanding the service, and it must be noted 
that subsidies and grants play an important role in fi nancing, especially in developing 
countries. As Talbot J.F., Chairman and CEO of SAUR International observes, there is 
“[The false] belief that any business must be good business and that the private sector 
has unlimited funds […] The scale of the need far outreaches the fi nancial and risk taking 
capacities of the private sector” (Budds and McGrahan 2003). Thus no matter how much 
it is discussed that the private sector gives leverage in fi nancial matters, the private sector 
can also face the same wrath as the public sector, especially in the case of failed regulatory 
operations. 
But the following empirical studies have a story to tell. One study which focuses 
on the cost function of water utilities states that whether public or private sectors manage 
water services, they try to minimize costs (Crain and Zardkoohi, 1978; Bruggink, 1982; 
Raffi ee et al., 1993; Bhattacharyya et al., 1994; Saal and Parker, 2000 (cited in Ouyahia 
2006). Citing the studies of Morgan (1977) and Crain and Zardkoohi (1978) Ouyahia 
(2006) found that “private water utilities on average have lower costs.” In contrast, 
Ouyahia  (2006) notes that Bruggink (1982), Feigenbaum and Teeples (1983), and Teeples 
and Glyer (1987a, 1987b) “found either no cost difference or that public utilities have 
lower costs.” 
Two studies conducted by Lynk (1993) and Bhattacharya et al. (1995) (cited in 
Ouyahia 2006) found that, because the public sector charges close to the average minimum 
cost when compared to the private sector, it is identifi ed as being more effi cient. Hence, 
it is more common to fi nd the private sector operating in those areas where these costs 
are higher, and this is aligned with the private sector’s cost recovery and profi t generation 
motive. 
But costs also depend on other factors, such as the amount of investment and 
the generation of revenues. Maximum productivity has to be achieved with maximum 
effi ciency to give maximum output, in the ideal conditions. But the fact that this is 
within ideal conditions must be stressed: ideal conditions can rarely be followed. Also, 
topography, population density, and externalities have to be considered in the case of 
productivity and performance (Ouyahia 2006).
To reduce budgetary defi cits, increase economic growth, develop capital markets 
and improve services was the rationale under which privatization was introduced in Asia 
(Ouyahia 2006: 14). However, private investment commitments to water projects still only 
make up 5 percent of the total investment share in developing countries (Ouyahia 2006: 
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13). A careful analysis should be undertaken as to which forms of private participation are 
most suitable. However, there is also a need to analyze the environmental impacts of the 
projects being carried out before and after the private sector becomes involved in water 
operation. This should be done mainly because the urban areas are fed with water from 
the neighbouring regions, while these neighbouring regions suffer from water scarcity. 
Water companies have exhibited an apprehensive approach towards investing in 
Asian and Latin American nations. As Budds and McGranahan (2003) note, companies’ 
main motives for investment in projects are profi t and returns. Their objectives have little 
to do with the targets and provision of services. Low-income areas do not present a viable 
market for investment from private water companies (Budds and McGranahan 2003: 
109). Water demand in poorer areas is also usually lower, and the record of payment is 
poor (Schusterman et al. 2002 in Ouyahia 2006). 
Research Analysis: The Water Distribution Improvement Project (Mumbai)
The primary reason for choosing the city of Mumbai for this case study is because of 
its dense population: the Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai (MCGM, online 
resource) estimated that 13 million people were living in the city in mid-2006. Additionally, 
Mumbai is a major contributor to the developing economy of India, and as such, reveals 
many of the social and environmental pitfalls a city faces when dealing with urbanization 
and population migration. The question must be raised as to how the city, with such a large 
and rapidly growing population, can cater for all its inhabitants’ needs, and in turn, how 
those needs can be met sustainably without causing lasting damage to the surrounding 
ecosystems and environment.  In order to achieve this, the city offi cials have to integrate 
water resources from neighbouring regions. 
Part of MCGM’s solution to these problems was to introduce a PPP scheme, with 
the view of improving the water system’s effi ciency and management. They initiated the 
“Water Distribution Improvement Project” in the locations of the K-East Ward. The New 
Zealand based group, Castalia, which had previously worked with the World Bank and the 
Public Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility (PPIAF), was called in as a consultant to 
the project. They reported that, although the ward had an acceptable quantity and quality 
of water, with the exception of a few areas and in times of monsoonal conditions, the 
customer service, equity of supply, and intermittent supply were still major issues that 
hampered the water’s delivery (Brihanmumbai Municipal Corporation et al. 2007).  
The slum population in the ward, which is estimated to be 290,000 people, is also 
a major constraint on the city’s water supply.  This is mainly because of the services have 
to be provided to them at the minimal rates. Also the issues of illegal connections make 
it more diffi cult. Additionally, according to the Tata Institute of Fundamental Research 
(TIFR, online source), some of the city’s water infrastructure is over 100 years old, which 
creates further problems in the maintenance of the system. Pipe leakages and bursts 
are a regular occurrence. Lastly, the intermittent supply of water causes contamination, 
inconvenience and inequity in distribution. 
Castalia reported that the creation of a consistent water supply could solve many 
of Mumbai’s water system problems (Brihanmumbai Municipal Corporation et al 2007). 
Out of the 540 million litres per day (mld) of water input to the ward, 110 mld are lost 
in leaking and burst pipes, billing errors and illegal consumption. The company devised 
the “Integrated Water Loss Reduction Project,” which proposed technical solutions, such 
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as installing meters, pressure zoning, zone-by-zone management, and active water loss 
reduction. Another solution was the Slum Network Upgrade Project, which focused 
on the rehabilitation of the infrastructure in the slum area, so as to improve equality in 
water supply, quality and quantity supplied. The fi nal major area that needs overhauling 
is customer service. At present, there has been no staff dedicated to handling consumer 
complaints.  In addition to this, the system for registering the complaints is done manually, 
which makes customer complaints diffi cult to monitor. 
In Castalia’s management-level solutions, Multiple Small Contracts, Single 
Medium-Term Outsourcing Contracts, Management Contracts, Lease Contracts, and 
Concession Contracts have all been proposed. However, they do not recommend total 
privatization, as they do not see this route as providing Mumbai with optimal solutions 
to its problem. Additionally, all too often privatization creates controversy within the 
community and social groups and NGOs who oppose it. They do recommend, though, the 
“corporatization” of whole departments as one of the other possible solutions. 
Challenges facing the Project
It is unfortunate that, to date, the “Water Distribution Improvement Project” has faced 
many obstacles, despite Castalia’s recommendations. There has been little information 
sharing between the public (MCGM) and the private (Castalia) sector, and although the 
latter carried out statistical analysis of the K-East ward in Mumbai prior to the project’s 
implementation, it is only possible to retrieve information with the help of MCGM. 
Additionally, it is diffi cult to access accurate fi gures, due to the challenges the study had 
gaining samples for water quality testing and information on illegal connections in the 
context of understanding unaccounted-for-water fi gures. 
To add to these issues, Castalia, being relatively new to the project area, has the 
obstacle of unfamiliarity to deal with when gathering data, especially when regulatory 
and implementation mechanisms have not been made clear. 
As the K-East ward website has not been updated since 2008, this study would 
benefi t from a fi eld study, if its merits are to be better understood. 
Recommendations
Considering the delicate role of water in our daily lives and the dependence the entire 
globe and its ecosystems have on this resource, the ownership and management of water 
should be an intermediary process involving both the public and private sectors, which 
embrace the best possible characteristics of both mechanisms. The community should 
also be involved in the process from the outset.  
In order for PPPs to be effective, an attractive environment has to be created, 
wherein the key roles and responsibilities of the actors/institutions “are separated, clearly 
defi ned, and allocated among all actors,” both in the public sector – at the national and 
local levels – and in the private sector (UNESC 2003: 12). Strong regulatory frameworks 
are also needed, in order to maintain coordination and effi ciency.
The UN Center for Human Settlements (1996) claims that the private sector can 
be effective in servicing low-income consumers also, but it needs to operate within a 
regulated environment that simultaneously allows service provider authorities to manage 
the utilities with greater autonomy. Fischer and Frohlich (2001) mentioned public and 
private sectors in the “conceptual themes of innovation systems” (cited in Amjad n.d.). 
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Competitive advantages are achieved by “the interaction between the generation, use 
and diffusion of new and economically useful knowledge” (Fisher and Frohlich 2001, 
cited in Amjad n.d.). Having said all this, it fi nally depends on the region where these 
partnerships are being executed, and what the situation may be before and after the 
project’s implementation. The root of the problem lies in the operation and maintenance 
of the water utility, not necessarily in the water supply (Dumol 2000).
Finally, an assessment needs to be undertaken based on six main criteria: 
“effi ciency and cost savings; fi nancial risk transfer; environmental risk and quality; issues 
of accountability and transparency; the impact of a project on workers and the community; 
and the economic development benefi ts” (Loxley et al. 1999). 
It is indeed possible that PPPs can offer solutions for the management of water resources, 
particularly in the areas of effi ciency, loss reduction and the provision of a continuous, 
equitable supply of water to the community. However, certain questions still remain, such 
as:
Should water be priced?1) 
If it is priced, what price should be levied if the poor cannot pay? 2) 
Should water be priced in a way that encourages people to acknowledge the true 3) 
value of this fi nite resource?
Is achieving a continuous water supply even viable, given water’s fi nite nature? 4) 
Can a continuous water supply actually solve other supply-related problems (as 5) 
suggested by Castalia)? 
The objectives of this article were to review the literature, history and background of 
public-private partnerships in relation to the context of privatization, since it is impossible 
to discuss PPPs without mentioning privatization and also examining the case of K-East 
Ward under the same context of PPPs. Much has been written about and discussed in the 
literature, but as Ouyahia (2006) mentions, there is “no one-size fi ts all” solution. Each of 
the regions or municipalities have to fi rst clearly set out their objectives, and analyze the 
checklist needed for a certain kind of private sector participation. 
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